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Modern Privacy Advocacy:  
An Approach at War with Privacy Itself? 
Justin “Gus” Hurwitz* 





This Article argues that the modern concept of privacy itself, 
particularly as framed by some of its most ardent advocates today, 
is fundamentally incoherent.  The Article highlights that many com-
mon arguments made in support of privacy, while initially seeming 
to protect this critical value, nonetheless undermine it in the long-
run.  Using both recent and older examples of applying classic pri-
vacy advocacy positions to key technological innovations, the au-
thors demonstrate how these positions, while seemingly privacy-en-
hancing at the time, actually resulted in outcomes that were less 
beneficial for consumers and citizens, including from a purely pri-
vacy-focused perspective.  As a result, the authors advocate for a 
privacy approach that focuses on the long-term results of particular 
proposals rather than the immediate results in a given circumstance.  
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 Privacy is one of the defining policy issues of our time.  In the digital era, 
privacy concerns are omnipresent.  From advertisers and online platforms 
seemingly tracking our every move online,1 to ongoing discussions about law 
enforcement’s need for access to encrypted communications to protect us 
against terrorists and other violent criminals,2 to the geopolitics of countries 
spying on one another’s citizens,3 concerns about individual privacy arise 
constantly in the public and private spheres, both domestically and abroad.  
But while concerns about privacy may be a defining issue of our time, that 
does not mean that privacy—at least as understood today by its most fervent 
advocates—is itself a well-defined concept.  To the contrary, privacy, as it is 
promoted today by well-heeled lobbyists from all manner of three-letter 
NGOs—and often funded by Silicon Valley tech companies guiltily worried 
about their own massive data collections—is a fundamentally incoherent 
concept.  This is because the way privacy is talked about publicly is often at 
odds with privacy-enhancing outcomes.  This incoherence is a defining 
characteristic both of privacy as a concept and the modern debates around that 
concept.  Indeed, it is this very incoherence that leads privacy advocates to 
often discount the impact of their ostensibly privacy-supporting activities on 
other privacy-related values and, more often than not, to take positions that, 
while appearing on the surface to protect privacy, actually undermine aspects 
of it in the long-run. 
This incoherence matters quite a bit.  As a general matter, we should all 
be deeply concerned about privacy and ought be prepared to protect it against 
depredations by private entities seeking commercial gain, governments 
seeking to snuff out political dissent and free speech, and individuals 
promoting malign agendas.  After all, our nation was founded by men and 
women who rightly had a healthy skepticism of overweening executive 
 
 1. See, e.g., Gabriel Weinberg, Google and Facebook are watching our every move online. It’s 
time to make them stop, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/31/google-facebook-data-privacy-
concerns-out-of-control-commentary.html (last updated Feb. 1, 2018, 12:30 AM) (according to 
Princeton Web Transparency & Accountability Project, “76 percent of websites now contain hidden 
Google trackers, and 24 percent have hidden Facebook trackers[.]”). 
 2. See, e.g., Tom Ridge, Law Enforcement’s Encryption Dilemma, HILL (Sept. 16, 2019, 11:30 
AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/cybersecurity/461558-law-enforcements-encryption-dilemma. 
 3. See, e.g., Alissa J. Rubin, French Condemn Surveillance by N.S.A., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 
2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/22/world/europe/new-report-of-nsa-spying-angers-france. 
html. 
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power,4 particularly as it intersected with the private sphere of the home as 
well as where it sought to intrude upon the core liberties codified in the first 
ten amendments to our Constitution.  Unfortunately, the privacy claims made 
by modern advocates often overreach and push the privacy values they mean 
to defend to incoherency, all the while undermining the very privacy rights 
that need defending.  We owe it to ourselves to check these overambitious 
claims so as to not undermine our legitimate efforts to protect our privacy, or 
worse, create actual poor outcomes, for individual privacy. 
Consider, for example, an issue from an earlier technological iteration of 
today’s fights: Caller ID.  Caller ID today is considered a basic feature of 
telephone calls and, indeed, most would consider it privacy-enhancing, akin 
to allowing individuals to know who is at the door before allowing them into 
their home.  Just as the peephole (or the modern doorbell cam) allows you to 
guard your home from all manner of unwanted visitors, including the (now-
fairly rare) door-to-door salesperson or evangelist, so too Caller ID protects 
the iPhone in your pocket from the modern war dialing robocallers and other 
solicitors. 
But when Caller ID was introduced in the early 1990s,5 some of today’s 
most prominent privacy advocates were among its fiercest opponents.6  From 
their perspective, Caller ID was a forced disclosure of personal information 
about the person initiating the call.7  To be fair, these advocates were generally 
concerned about legitimate cases where disclosure of that information could 
 
 4. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison).  
 5. Rules and Policies Regarding Calling Number Identification Service–Caller ID, 59 Fed. Reg. 
18318 (April 18, 1994), https://www.fcc.gov/document/rules-and-policies-regarding-calling-num-
ber-identification-service-3. 
 6. See, e.g., Cindy Skrzycki, Caller ID: Grappling With Issues of Privacy, WASH. POST (June 21, 
1991), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1991/06/21/caller-id-grappling-with-is-
sues-of-privacy/8fffd9cb-a14a-4ed7-9286-8cba7637b39d/; States News Service, ‘Caller ID’ Stirs De-
bate on Phone Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 1990), https://www.nytimes.com/1990/02/11/nyre-
gion/caller-id-stirs-debate-on-phone-privacy.html (quoting Marc Rotenberg, who a few years later 
founded EPIC); Anthony Ramirez, Caller ID: Consumer’s Friend of Foe?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 1992), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1992/04/04/news/caller-id-consumer-s-friend-or-foe.html; Mark Calvey, 
Caller ID: Is Anybody Out There?, S.F. BUS. TIMES (Oct. 13, 1996 9:00 PM), https://www.bizjour-
nals.com/sanfrancisco/stories/1996/10/14/focus4.html (discussing Caller ID privacy concerns and 
noting the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, which published a “Privacy FAQ” about “Caller ID and My 
Privacy”); see also Fact Sheet 19: Caller ID and My Privacy, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE 
(Aug. 2000), https://web.archive.org/web/20110524111020/http:/www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs19-cid. 
htm. 
 7. Skrzycki, supra note 6. 
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prove problematic: whistleblowers, for instance, being unable to make 
anonymous calls and abuse victims unable to receive phone calls from shelters 
without their abusers being aware of the call’s origin.8  But hindsight teaches 
us that these advocates’ concerns about these specific issues were, at best, the 
tail wagging a much larger dog of an issue; a dog, by the way, that ended up 
being much better for individual privacy. 
The story of Caller ID, in many ways, is a classic demonstration of one 
of the basic challenges of privacy: namely, the reciprocal nature of privacy 
claims and rights.  My right to know who is calling me (that is, who is seeking 
to invade my privacy) comes at the expense of the caller’s right to control 
disclosure of their identity.9  There is no reason to assume, at the outset, that 
one or the other of these values is necessarily more important to protect.  No 
matter the general merits of a given privacy rule, there will always be specific 
cases in which the general rule gets things wrong.  As a result, the general 
efficacy of such a privacy rule can wax or wane as technology, social values, 
and political realities change.  One lesson to be taken from this inherent 
feature of privacy claims is that we can (and should) be cautious about 
adopting privacy rules that are prescriptively rigid.  With Caller ID, for 
instance, the market has responded with technologies and services that allow 
legitimate blocking of Caller ID information when needed to preserve 
sensitive information.  This flexibility, supported and fostered by policies that 
were initially derided by the so-called “privacy community,” has ultimately 
led to a world that largely supports (and benefits from) both sides of the 
privacy value proposition.10 
We see similar incoherence in more contemporary examples.  Consider 
the long-running Wiretap Act litigation against Google’s Gmail 
service.11  When Gmail receives an email for one of its users, it electronically 
scans the contents of that email to target focused advertising to that user.12  
This includes emails sent to Google’s users, even by people who don’t use 
 
 8. See States News Service, supra note 6. 
 9. See Skrzycki, supra note 6. 
 10. See, e.g., Ernie Smith, Know Who’s Calling, TEDIUM (Dec. 5, 2019), https://tedium.co/2019/ 
12/05/telephone-caller-id-history/. 
 11. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2018); In re Google Inc. Gmail Litig., No. 13-MD-02430-
LHK, 2013 WL 5423918, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 26, 2013). 
 12. Google Inc., 2013 WL 5423918, at *1. 
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Gmail.13  Nearly  a decade ago, a group of consumers—who were not Gmail 
users—sued Google, arguing that Google’s scanning of their emails violated 
their privacy rights, as protected by the Wiretap Act.14 
The suit was ultimately settled after nearly a decade of litigation.15  But it 
settled on terms that once again demonstrate the incoherence of the underlying 
privacy construct crafted by modern privacy groups.  Google agreed to stop 
scanning the contents of emails at the time they were received by its email 
services.16  Instead, Google agreed that it would wait until those emails had 
been delivered to the intended recipient’s email inbox.17  Then, Google, 
relying on the explicit consent of the owner of the inbox, could conduct the 
exact same scan it had previously conducted and deliver the exact same ad it 
would previously have served up.18 
As a result of this change—which literally amounts to requiring that 
Google’s email scanning systems wait a fraction of a second longer before 
scanning emails—the privacy advocates and plaintiffs’ lawyers who brought 
suit take the view that Google is no longer violating the privacy rights of the 
non-Google users.19  No matter that nothing of substance has changed from a 
practical or a privacy perspective.  Given this episode, and many others like 
it, one might reasonably ask whether the privacy claims being raised here are 
merely a charade designed to raise funds for advocates and line the pockets of 
trial lawyers, all the while agitating average Gmail users and making Google 
reorganize its otherwise perfectly acceptable technology, all for naught. 
Or consider another suit against Google, in which the Wi-Fi-enabled 
Google Street View vehicles (those responsible for the detailed local images 
available in Google Maps) recorded not only images of houses taken from the 
public streets, but also the names and locations of wireless networks being 
 
 13. See Matera v. Google Inc., No. 15-CV-04062-LHK, 2016 WL 5339806, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 
23, 2016). 
 14. See id. at *4. 
 15. See Mot. Prelim. Approval Class Action Settlement and Mem. P. & A., Matera, No. 5:15-cv-
04062 LHK. 
 16. See id. at 5. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. (“Class Counsel believes that these technical changes are substantial and that these changes, 
once implemented, will bring Google’s email processing practices in compliance with Class Counsel’s 
view of the California Invasion of Privacy Act . . . and the Electronic Communications Privacy 
Act . . . .”). 
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broadcast from those houses.20  Once again the Wiretap Act was invoked, this 
time by lawyers (including, to be fair, one of the authors of this piece for at 
least a short time) and privacy advocates arguing that Google had violated the 
privacy rights of homeowners by recording the network names their routers 
were broadcasting over the public airwaves.21  Never mind that the Wiretap 
Act expressly exempts information broadcast over public airwaves from 
protection under the Act,22 and never mind that wireless networks can be 
configured expressly not to broadcast their names by privacy-concerned 
users.23 
Amazingly, in this case, the Ninth Circuit held that the public 
broadcasting of packets on public radio spectrum with Wi-Fi routers was not 
covered by the Wiretap Act’s exemption of broadcasts on radio spectrum, 
despite the signals being broadcast on radio spectrum.24  Oddly, at least one 
implication of this opinion is that each one of us violates the Wiretap Act any 
time our computer displays to us a list of Wi-Fi networks available in the local 
area because we are obtaining and recording—at least temporarily—the 
broadcast packets from these Wi-Fi networks.  Once again, while there is no 
coherent (or practical) distinction between Google intercepting those packets 
as part of its mapping service and your computer intercepting them to display 
it to you, other than perhaps the ephemeral timeframe for which you hold the 
relevant data, in one instance privacy advocates claim the sky is falling, while 
in the other ordinary citizens go about their business happy to be able to get 
on the local airport Wi-Fi without asking around for the network name.  
Privacy, it seems, is very much in the eye of the beholder. 
And, of course, there’s the never-ending debate between the privacy 
groups and the national security and law enforcement communities over 
encryption.25  As demonstrated all too well in the aftermath of the 2015 San 
 
 20. See Joffe v. Google, 746 F.3d 920, 922–23 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 21. Id. at 922. 
 22. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i) (2018). 
 23. See Joffe, 746 F.3d at 931 (“[T]he recipient of those communications [can decide] to secure 
her wireless network . . . [by] tak[ing] care to encrypt her own Wi-Fi network.”). 
 24. Id. at 929–31. 
 25. See, e.g., Katie Benner, Barr Asks Apple to Unlock Pensacola Killer’s Phones, Setting Up 
Clash, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/13/us/politics/pensacola-shoot-
ing-iphones.html; see also Charlie Savage, Justice Dept. Revives Push to Mandate a Way to Un-
lock Phones, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/24/us/politics/unlock-
phones-encryption.html. 
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Bernardino terrorist shooting, and more recently in the case of the Saudi 
military shooter in Pennsylvania, companies like Apple have taken steps—
ostensibly in an effort to protect user privacy—to encrypt data in a manner 
that makes it virtually impossible for law enforcement to access, even with a 
lawful court order.26  While on its face this might seem like a purely privacy 
enhancing move, consider both the short- and long-term ramifications of 
Apple’s decision to pick a fight with the government and to refuse to assist it 
with its completely sensible (and lawful) request to access the county-owned 
work phone of the San Bernardino shooter.  In that case, even though Apple 
had the consent of the owner of the phone, and the FBI had obtained a court 
order from a judge requiring Apple to provide assistance to the government, 
Apple fought back, aggressively taking the position that providing such 
assistance would be inappropriate, and that to do so would undermine the 
privacy of its (here, terrorist) user(s).27  The FBI was ultimately able to access 
the terrorist’s phone by obtaining an exploit from a private company that took 
advantage of a heretofore undisclosed vulnerability in Apple’s encryption 
system.28  Of course, Apple immediately demanded that the FBI hand over 
this vulnerability so that Apple might protect its users from further hacks; not 
surprisingly, having faced down a completely unreasonable Apple in court, 
the FBI refused.29  The net outcome of this fight: law enforcement got access 
to the data on the phone, Apple played no role in assisting with (or potentially 
limiting) such access, and tens of thousands of iPhone users became instantly 
more vulnerable, with both a private company and the FBI having access to 
an exploit that rendered their hardware-based encryption ineffectual.  Hardly 
a privacy-enhancing outcome.30 
And worse still, this incident with Apple and privacy groups backing the 
 
 26. See Benner, supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Ellen Nakashima, FBI Paid Professional Hackers One-Time Fee to Crack San Bernardino 
iPhone, WASH. POST (Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/fbi-
paid-professional-hackers-one-time-fee-to-crack-san-bernardino-iphone/2016/04/12/5397814a-00de-
11e6-9d36-33d198ea26c5_story.html. 
 29. See id. 
 30. See, e.g., Jamil N. Jaffer & Daniel J. Rosenthal, Why Apple’s Stand Against the F.B.I. Hurts 
Its Own Customers, N.Y.TIMES (Apr. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/09/opinion/why-
apples-stand-against-the-fbi-hurts-its-own-customers.html; Jamil N. Jaffer & Daniel J. Rosenthal, 
How Apple's Fight with the FBI Will Hurt Our Privacy, POLITICO (Feb. 26, 2016), https:// 
www.politico.com/agenda/story/2016/02/how-apples-fight-with-the-government-hurts-our-privacy-
000055/. 
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most extreme position possible—that they wouldn’t help law enforcement 
access a known terrorist’s work phone after more than a dozen people were 
brutally murdered in broad daylight—will almost certainly be cited down the 
road when the government seeks to obtain legislation mandating lawful access 
to encrypted data in the aftermath of a mass-casualty terrorist attack.31  This 
is because if privacy advocates and technologists of all stripes continue to 
stamp their feet, scrunch up their eyes, and remain unwilling to work on 
potential options for lawful access to encrypted data ahead of time,  we are 
likely to see a solution imposed by political leaders that will at once be 
insufficient to do the job, while being excessively costly from both the 
financial and privacy perspective.32 
At the end of the day, there are a few things that perhaps ought to be said 
about modern privacy advocacy.  First, as a general matter, it comes from a 
good place.  These are advocates genuinely committed to protecting and 
defending a critically important right of individuals.  Second, protection of 
individual privacy is something that we all ought to cherish as it is a 
cornerstone of our system of democratic governance, and it is at the heart of 
the very ideals that our framing generation sought to uphold in crafting our 
Constitution.  Third, and perhaps most important, privacy is not an 
incommensurable good that ought not be weighed against other values, but 
rather one that must be protected in light of the larger dynamics and threats 
that might ultimately result in worse outcomes.  After all, our framers never 
once thought that our private spaces were forever invulnerable against 
government access; to the contrary, they specifically provided for such access, 
setting up a system of neutral, third-party magistrates and specific legal 
standards to be met before the government might obtain such access.33  The 
final lesson we’ve learned about modern privacy advocacy is that privacy 
overreach—of the variety practiced by most (if not all) of today’s modern 
advocacy groups—is often likely to result in worse outcomes for privacy, 
regardless of the noble intent of those promoting such efforts. 
The bottom-line, therefore, is this: while privacy is a critical value that 
 
 31. See Jamil N. Jaffer & Daniel J. Rosenthal, Decrypting Our Security: A Bipartisan Argument 
for a Rational Solution to the Encryption Challenge, 24 CATH. U. J. LAW & TECH. 273, 278–81 
(2016), https://scholarship.law.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1012&con-
text=jlt. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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we all must fight to defend, when we engage in that fight without an eye 
towards the bigger picture and the short- and long-term consequences of our 
privacy claims, we may often end up doing more harm than good for this 
critical value that we all seek to protect. 
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